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Abstract
We attempt a justification of a generalisation of the consistent histo-
ries programme using a notion of probability that is valid for all complete
sets of history propositions. This consists of introducing Cox’s axioms
of probability theory and showing that our candidate notion of proba-
bility obeys them. We also give a generalisation of Bayes’ theorem and
comment upon how Bayesianism should be useful for the quantum grav-
ity/cosmology programmes.
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During this paper we will introduce a novel notion of probability within the
framework of a histories theory. Firstly, we shall introduce Cox’s axioms of
probability theory and then show that our proposed notion of probability obeys
them. Secondly we shall discuss the implications of such Bayesian probability
assignments on the physical foundations of quantum history theories, quantum
cosmology and relational gravity theories.
So, one can derive the standard rules of Bayesian probability theory from
axioms that notions of probable inference should obey. This was shown by Cox
[1] who gave two simple axioms and derived probability theory from them. One
of the axioms is that the probability that two propositions α and β are both true
upon a given hypothesis I should functionally depend only upon the probability
of one of the propositions upon the same hypothesis and the probability of the
other proposition upon the same hypothesis conjoined with the presumption
that the former proposition is true. This can be written schematically as:
p(α ∧ β|I) := F [p(α|βI), p(β|I)]. (1)
where F is some function to be determined that is sufficiently well-behaved for
our purposes.
Cox’s other axiom is simply that the probability of the negation of a propo-
sition upon a given hypothesis should depend only upon the probability of that
proposition upon the same hypothesis. This can similarly be written as:
p(¬α|I) := G[p(α|I)]. (2)
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Of course, there is an implicit zeroth axiom that probabilities should be
represented by real numbers. Using such axioms Cox derived that the standard
probability rules must be obeyed.
However, once one attempts to derive probability as a form of probable
inference one is not wholly clear about the status of the zeroth axiom. Certain
probabilities must be considered real when they are to be interpreted as relative
frequencies but, in terms of a theory of probable inference, there is no a priori
reason why probabilities should be real. In fact, we can split up the zeroth
axiom into two further axioms [2]. Firstly we can presume the transitivity of
probability assignments:
Axiom 0a: If p(α|I) > p(β|I) and p(β|I) > p(γ|I)
then p(α|I) > p(γ|I) (3)
where ‘>’ is an ordering notion that is defined on the space we use to represent
probabilities.
Secondly, we can presume what is called ‘universal comparability’:
Axiom 0b: For all α, β we have that either p(α|I) > p(β|I)
or p(α|I) < p(β|I) or p(α|I) = p(β|I). (4)
The combination of axioms 0a and 0b ensures that probability assignments
can be real numbers. Obviously axioms 0a and 0b are restrictions upon the
type of probability space we desire for notions of probable inference. However,
we might easily not desire axiom 0b, especially in the light of quantum theory
and special relativity. There are physical reasons why we might not be able to
universally compare certain propositions probabilistically. For example, should
we be able to compare two statements that involve spacelike separated regions,
or that involve incompatible variables? A form of probability that does compare
such statements might involve unjustified inference. So not only do we argue
that probabilities need not be real numbers, we also argue that, in certain
physical situations, they should not be real numbers. The reals simply might not
have enough structure to represent a plausible notion of probability in certain
situations. See also [3] for other reasons why we might choose not to use reals
for all notions of probability.
This is a thesis argued rather cogently by Youssef [4, 5] who argues that
complex numbers and quaternions could also be consistent with Cox’s two ax-
ioms (or rather axioms analogous to Cox’s). Such work attempts a derivation
of the consistency of complex numbers with Cox’s two axioms by presuming a
distributive lattice of propositions. One can then derive quantum mechanical
features for such probability theories. We shall not comment upon this work
much more but rather we take a slightly different tack; we would like to discuss
quantum history theories [6, 7, 8, 9].
Following [9], we can define a homogeneous history as an ordered tensor
product of Heisenberg picture projection operators:
α := αˆtn(tn)⊗ αˆtn−1(tn−1)⊗ ...αˆt2(t2)⊗ αˆt1(t1) (5)
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such that tn > tn−1 > ...t2 > t1 > t0 and αˆtn(tn) = Uˆ(tn − t0)αˆtnUˆ
†(tn − t0)
where αˆtn is a standard Schro¨dinger picture operator and Uˆ is the standard
unitary evolution operator. The ordered set of times upon which an homoge-
neous history is defined is called its temporal support. Inhomogeneous histories
can then be defined using ‘∨’ or ‘¬’ operations that are naturally defined [9] to
produce an algebra of history propositions. There are also natural notions of
disjointness and exhaustivity. In the consistent histories programme one nor-
mally defines what is called the decoherence functional d which can then be
used to define relative frequencies for some complete (disjoint and exhaustive)
sets of histories—these are the same relative frequencies as predicted by the von
Neumann collapse hypothesis [10]. Sets in which the relative frequencies are
well-defined are called d-consistent and not all complete sets are d-consistent.
However, we do not wish to discuss relative frequencies per se; we would rather
discuss the more general notion of Bayesian probabilities.
One can naturally define what is called the class operator of such a history
[9]:
Cα := αˆtn(tn)αˆtn−1(tn−1)...αˆt2 (t2)αˆt1(t1). (6)
Such class operators can also be defined for inhomogeneous combinations of
homogeneous histories [9] in a natural manner. We have the property that, for
disjoint homogeneous histories that are defined over the same temporal supports,
the class operators just add:
Cα∨β = αˆtn(tn)...αˆt1 (t1) + βˆtn(tn)...βˆt1(t1). (7)
Instead of using the subset of the set of complete sets of history propo-
sitions that are d-consistent one can define a larger subset that are Linearly
Positive (LP)—this larger subset was introduced by Goldstein and Page [12] as
an alternative to the d-consistent subset which is used in the standard consis-
tent histories programme. Recent work [11] has shown that there is a certain
amount of consistency between a real notion of Bayesian probability and the LP
formalism. These LP probabilities seem to obey Bayesian reasoning whereas the
standard notion of probability using the decoherence functional does not. Thus
we have a ‘good’—it seems to obey Cox’s axioms—notion of probability for the
LP subset of the space of history propositions. We do not, however, have an
assignment that is good for all complete sets. All in all, it seems rather im-
plausible that such a real probability can be found. We might instead be able
to invoke a complex notion of probability. The decoherence functional gives
complex numbers but it does not obey (2) and is designed specifically with the
aim of giving real probabilities. Note that its form is derived specifically by
presuming von Neumann collapse which gives a natural notion of relative fre-
quency [13]. So, von Neumann collapses are designed to give something real.
Without presuming von Neumann collapse one is also released from discussing
solely relative frequencies.
The most obvious complex candidate is simply:
p(α|I) := tr(Cαρ) (8)
where ρ is the initial density matrix (defined at t0) and α is either homogeneous
as in (5) or is an inhomogeneous proposition defined by combining homogeneous
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histories using the natural ‘∨’ and ‘¬’ operations [9]. The real part of this
candidate behave like normal probabilities for the LP subset [12, 11]. Also,
given the natural algebra of history propositions [9], (8) obeys (2):
p(¬α|I) = tr((1− Cα)ρ) = tr(ρ)− tr(Cαρ) = G[p(α|I)] (9)
where 1 is the unit history proposition.
If Cox’s other axiom (1) is to be obeyed in situations where we have the
associativity of the ‘∧’ operation such that:
α ∧ (β ∧ γ) = (α ∧ β) ∧ γ = α ∧ β ∧ γ (10)
then Bayes’ rule should be valid (by Cox’s proof [1]). Hence we should have
that:
p(α|βI) =
tr(Cα∧βρ)
tr(Cβρ)
(11)
which is well-defined as long as tr(Cβρ) 6= 0. Note that the ‘∧’ is commutative
for homogeneous histories defined upon the same temporal support such that
α ∧ β = β ∧ α. Hence Cox’s proof of the multiplication rule also remains valid:
p(α|βI)p(β|I) = p(β|αI)p(α|I). (12)
Now we must ask ourselves whether such a complex probability assignment
is (a) consistent (b) unique and (c) useful? Since it obeys Cox’s axioms then it
has a certain amount of consistency as a probability assignment. Question (b)
is quite hard to answer but we can certainly begin to tackle (c). Hartle [14] has
recently suggested (also see [15]) that virtual probabilities—real but not within
[0, 1]—might be useful as intermediate steps in any quantum analysis. In light
of axiom 0b we would prefer to go the whole hog and discuss a different space
for the probabilities altogether—Hartle’s virtual probabilities are real so should
be rejected unless one weakens one of the probability axioms, but axiom 0b is
the most plausible to weaken and would give something other than the reals;
thus it seems more natural to invoke the full complex probability. Also note the
rather good analogy between the above and Youssef’s work [5]. Youssef attempts
to prove that complex and quarterion probabilities are compatible with Cox’s
axioms (or rather some axioms akin to Cox’s) combined with the presumption
that there exists a sublattice where the normal real probabilities are obtained.
This is a necessary feature of such a theory since axiom 0b should presumably
apply to a subset of propositions, just not universally. Such an argument adds
weight to Youssef’s derivation of quantum-like features—similarly for Caticha’s
recent pedagogical derivation of a quantum theory [16]. Similarly we could ask
the same question for history theories—and we have shown elsewhere [11] that
there is a subset of histories where the standard Bayesian rules apply—but we
already have a complex object that might obey Cox’s axioms; namely (8).
If we are willing to accept a complex probability then note that the natural
candidate behaves in a rather nice way. When histories α and β are homoge-
neous (and defined over the same temporal support) and disjoint (α ∧ β = 0
where 0 is used to denote the null history) then we have that:
tr(Cα∨βρ) = tr(Cαρ) + tr(Cβρ). (13)
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So, in such situations our complex probability assignment behaves in the
completely standard manner:
p(α ∨ β|I) = p(α|I) + p(β|I)− p(α ∧ β|I). (14)
Although this does not yet convince us that such an assignment is really
useful conceptually, at least it behaves in a nice manner for such a large number
of histories—it is valid for all complete sets of homogeneous histories.
Note that α ∧ β = β ∧ α for homogeneous histories defined over the same
temporal support regardless of commutation issues at each time point. In the
simple case of two homogeneous histories defined over the same temporal sup-
port, where the projection operators at each time point commute, we have that:
tr(Cα∨βρ) = tr(Cαρ) + tr(Cβρ)− tr(Cα∧βρ). (15)
For example, for two two-time histories in the HPO formulation α = αˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2
and β = βˆt1 ⊗ βˆt2 such that [αˆt1 , βˆt1 ] = 0 and [αˆt2 , βˆt2 ] = 0 we have that:
α ∨ β = α+ β − αˆt1 βˆt1 ⊗ αˆt2 βˆt2 (16)
= α+ β − (αˆt1 ∧ βˆt1)⊗ (αˆt2 ∧ βˆt2). (17)
So, at least for disjoint and commuting homogeneous histories, our probability
assignment behaves in the standard manner.
The major use of this ‘Bayesian Histories’ formalism is its simplicity; and
its ease of generalisation. What we have is a formalism that behaves as a
standard probability theory for all complete sets of histories. The probabilities
just happen to be complex. One might like to ask why we should use complex
numbers and we can see that they do not obey axiom 0b. Youssef [5] argues that,
of the spaces that don’t obey 0b, we should use complex or quaternion numbers
because they can also obey Cox’s other two axioms. Note that the natural
partial orders on complex numbers can obey axiom 0a. He uses a distributive
lattice for his argument so we have yet to complete his argument fully for the
non-distributive history algebra proper. We shall not attempt to do such a thing
here.
Even given such complex probabilities, we always know that we can get
standard real Bayesian probabilities out for a certain subset of the space of
history propositions and, furthermore, we can get out relative frequencies by
further defining d-consistency (note that d-consistency might not be the only
way for us to get relative frequencies). The point is that we don’t need all
that, we know that we can get such things out in the end; for now we can
just search for well-behaved Bayesian probabilities in domains not yet studied.
Hence it is the simplicity and generality of such an unreal probability programme
which means it might be useful in the quantum gravity domain. Note that
what type of space of probability we use is dependent upon the space and
logic of the history propositions we invoke; note also that we require notions
of kinematics and dynamics before we can discuss our probability assignments
(we use the Heisenberg picture). So perhaps quantum gravity will benefit from
explicitly not using standard quantum theory (as is usually the case) and we
can simply search for a consistent Bayesian probability assignment for whatever
propositional space one ends up deriving by other means, say using causal sets
5
(which, presuming some form of background independence, should include both
kinematical and dynamical aspects of the theory). Youssef [5] has shown that
even for distributive logics one can derive many quantum mechanical features
from just invoking a complex probability, so a general path is clear: try and
find a natural proposition space to be derived prior to probabilistic notions, and
then invoke Bayesian reasoning to get the quantum mechanical features from
the theory.
So, weirdly enough, Bayesianism might be very useful in relational theories
of gravity (where it is rarely invoked; see [17, 18] for tentative proposals in this
area). Here we would briefly like to discuss a few curious analogies between
relationism and Bayesian philosophy. There are two basic principles of rela-
tionism according to Leibniz. Firstly there is the ‘principle of sufficient reason’,
and secondly there is the ‘principle of identifying the indiscernible’ (see [19] for
an accessible discussion of relationalism). These two principles are connected
by the Bayesian ‘principle of insufficient reason’ which states that if you do
not have a rational reason for differentiating two statements you should assign
them identical probabilities. If you do have a rational reason for differentiating
statements then you should assign different probabilities according to rational
rules. Thus, foundationally, Bayesian probability theory is wholly compatible
with a relational philosophy. In fact, these two philosophical standpoints might
be identified in the future. Bayesian probability is a way of representing such
relational ideas via a probability space—the relational nature of gravity theo-
ries may help us, rather than hinder us, in searching for quantum probabilities.
Hence why we believe this Bayesian histories programme may be useful for
quantum gravity theories. We intend to investigate such a quantum gravity
programme in future work.
Of course, acceptance of the above programme relies significantly upon a
Bayesian view of probabilities. So, let me now briefly discuss why such a view-
point is useful. Firstly note that Bayesian probabilities aren’t incompatible with
notions of relative frequency. Quite the opposite; Bayesian probabilities can in-
corporate most notions of relative frequencies within the literature, whereas
theories of relative frequencies need to be designed for the problem at hand
[2]. Bayesian probability theory is an umbrella philosophy that can incorporate
many different notions of relative frequency (using notions of independence, ex-
changability, and maximum entropy for example). Also, Bayesian probability
is pedagogically useful because of the lack of philosophical presumptions that
goes into the theory. One can show that any notion of probable inference that
obeys completely transparent axioms must behave as we expect. Caticha has
also recently shown that entropy formulae can also be derived in a particularly
Bayesian way [20] (and references therein). Entropy is normally considered a
physical property of systems but Caticha shows that one can sometimes consis-
tently take an opposing view. What better way to investigate a concept than
to explicitly give the axioms by which we are allowed to consistently state it?
Especially since there might be physical cases where such axioms are violated.
This is the pedagogical power of the Bayesian programme. Since such axioms
are clearly defined, the Bayesian programme is also ripe for generalisation be-
cause certain axioms can be relaxed if there are cogent reasons for doing so.
This is not the case with relative frequencies which do not have such a clear
pedagogical basis.
Often Bayesian probabilities are rejected because they are considered sub-
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jective. This, however, is the wrong way to look at it. It is only by considering
probabilities as subjective that we can begin to understand the reasons we use
the concept ‘probability’ as we do. Calling probability ‘objective’, when we can
never measure it directly, is not good ontology, especially since such ‘objective’
probabilities are usually invoked as relative frequencies which in turn are de-
fined using an entirely unphysical notion of infinite ensembles. One can never
measure ‘entropy’ or ‘probability’, one can only apply (either consistently or
inconsistently) these concepts to the measurements we make [21]. ‘Entropy’
and ‘probability’ are forms of reasoning we use, not things that are. We must
work out why and how we use these concepts. Assuming that they are objective
properties of systems does not help us in this enterprise as it only gives us the
opportunity to accept them without thinking about why we use them in the
way we do. So, it is better to derive such concepts from a consistent set of
plausible axioms. Having to invoke some subjectivity in the notion of probabil-
ity is thus not the result of the programme, it is the whole pedagogical basis of
doing things in a Bayesian manner. One must first assume that probabilities are
subjective in order to then begin to work out why we ought to assign a certain
probability over another. It is also clear that these plausible axioms are not a
priori philosophical axioms; we require them to be consistent with the physics
we are doing, and the physics we are doing can justify further generalisations
or axioms. So the term ‘subjective’ should not be considered synonymous with
‘not physical’ or ‘arbitrary’.
Another reason Bayesian probabilities are sometimes rejected (especially by
quantum cosmologists) is because of the notion of ‘observers’ that is often kept
explicit. Perhaps this is a misconception however, as is shown by the pervasive
use of Bayesian methods in the astrophysics community. Bayesian probability
doesn’t require that we have observers floating around and that we must model
them—the observers need not be ‘in’ the theory nor ‘outside’ the system being
discussed. Bayesianism is more about what ‘we’, as theorists, are allowed to
consistently say about a theory. There is no measurement problem as soon
as one accepts that it is necessarily ‘us’ who are interpreting a theory. We
can either interpret a theory consistently or inconsistently; Bayesianism is an
attempt to do so consistently. Thus we do not need to invoke ‘observers’—one
can do so for pedagogical reasons but it is not a necessary feature of Bayesian
physics. One should rather use rational ‘interpreters’ instead of ‘observers’ but
even that is just a pedagogical notion and could still be removed from the
foundations of the theory. Interpreters are pedagogically invoked for the same
reason that we need subjectivity; we must first presume that we could interpret
things differently before we can begin to constrain how we ought to interpret
things. No two equals are the same. So, such interpreters are not ‘passive’
because they are rational but nor are they ‘invasive’—we don’t have to assume
that they (‘we’) are physically effecting the world around them (‘us’) through
rationalising.
Note that implicit in our definition of probability is a notion of dynamics (we
are using the Heisenberg picture). We also explicitly have a notion of initial state
ρ. This may confuse some Bayesian practitioners because ρ is often considered
subjective and we should be able to update any state assignment given further
information. However, if we are to be discussing closed quantum systems then
the dynamics and the initial state must first be postulated [22]. They could be
postulated through Bayesian reasoning, but we do not discuss such a possibility
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here.
Clearly we are not presenting a complete programme. We still have to ar-
gue a direct path between weakening 0b and getting necessarily to complex
numbers for the history algebra. This would presumably involve a physical jus-
tification for not probabilistically comparing those statements that a complex
probability allows us not to compare universally. Note, however, the analogy
between Bayesianism and Gleason’s theorem: (1) and (2) are effectively non-
contextuality assumptions. Hence we remain hopeful that a uniqueness theorem
may be forthcoming, perhaps analogous to the work in [23]. We are also still
not clear how the notion of entropy should be generalised in such domains, but
we do not rule out that it also might be complex. Note that the real part of
(8) behaves like a normal Bayesian probability for the LP subset so the normal
formula of Shannon entropy should also behave as normal for the LP subset
[11].
Note that we can justify the use of complex numbers in the following na¨ıve
manner. For single-time propositions we have that Pˆ † = Pˆ but for history
propositions we have that C††α = Cα. By conjugating twice we get back to the
original assignment (cf. (2)). So by reasoning in a Bayesian manner we may
wish to invoke a third axiom above and beyond Cox’s two:
p(MαM |I) := H [p(α|I)], (18)
where H is some function to be determined that is sufficiently well-behaved for
our purposes, andM acts on tensor product vectors so as to change the order of
its entriesM(v1⊗v2⊗...vm) := (vm⊗vm−1⊗...v1)—thereforeMαM is the homo-
geneous history proposition that represents the time reversed situation (since we
are in the Heisenberg picture—see (5)—this reverses both the kinematical order-
ing and the dynamical order [24]),M(Pˆ1⊗Pˆ2⊗...⊗Pˆn)M := Pˆn⊗Pˆn−1⊗...⊗Pˆ1.
If we were to just change the kinematical order then we would get a different
history, but by changing both we ensure a full time reversal of the history propo-
sition. Now, should we assign the same probability to these opposite temporal
orderings? Note that our definition of probability contains the initial state, as
part of our hypothesis I, which hasn’t been affected by the time reversal.
tr(CMαMρ) = tr(C
†
αρ). (19)
So, although we have changed the order of the history proposition the initial
state hasn’t been changed to a final state. The time symmetry is broken by
this fact so we are rationally compelled to assign different probabilities to α and
MαM upon hypothesis I; and if we are assign different probabilities to each
then we should do so in a manner that obeys something akin to Cox’s axioms
so that we keep our assignments consistent—hence we invoke (18). So reversing
the time ordering ensures that the history proposition is fully time reversed but
we can’t interpret it in a fully time reversed manner because the initial state
is sequentially prior to a different projection operator, so we cannot invoke a
time symmetry argument to assign equal probabilities; but nor should we order
the probabilities of p(α|I) and p(MαM |I) using axiom 0b because otherwise
we would be a priori promoting a particular temporal ordering, when we can’t
rationally do so. We should not irrationally presume that p(α|I) = p(MαM |I)
by some na¨ıve time symmetry argument and we should ensure such assign-
ments obey (18). Hence, perhaps, we could use complex numbers to represent
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probabilities. The direction of time competes with the direction of inference.
We have used four notions of ordering: kinematical, dynamical, inferential,
probabilistic—we do not want to confuse them.
Cox’s two axioms suggest we must invoke probabilities that are consistent
with the ∧ and ¬ operations; our tentative third axiom (18) suggests we should
also make assignments that are consistent with the M operation. We have yet
to prove whether such an extra axiom necessarily forces us to use the assignment
(8), although clearly (8) obeys the axioms.
Note also that the conditional complex probabilities defined using Bayes’
theorem (11) behave in a nice manner; we have that, for all complete sets of
homogeneous histories defined over the same temporal support {αi}Nαi=1 such
that β is also homogeneous, on the same temporal support, and commutes with
the αi:
Nα∑
i=1
p(αi|βI) = 1. (20)
This is because we have a certain amount of distributivity for such histories:
∑
i
(αi ∧ β) = (
∑
i
αi) ∧ β. (21)
For example, for two-time homogeneous histories in the HPO formulation [9] we
have that:
(α1 + α2) ∧ β = (αˆ1t2(t2)⊗ αˆ
1
t1
(t1) + αˆ
2
t2
(t2)⊗ αˆ
2
t1
(t1)) ∧ βˆt2(t2)⊗ βˆt1(t1)
= (α1 ∧ β) + (α2 ∧ β). (22)
This property arises because history propositions are projection operators on
some larger histories Hilbert space; it is a standard result that distributivity is
obeyed for mutually commuting projection operators. It passes across to the
class operators such that:
Nα∑
i=1
tr(Cαi∧βρ)
tr(Cβρ)
=
tr(C1∧βρ)
tr(Cβρ)
=
tr(Cβρ)
tr(Cβρ)
= 1. (23)
Thus updating by Bayes’ theorem in this manner gives a posteriori probabilities
that behave in exactly the same manner as the a priori ones. For complete sets
of homogeneous histories that are defined over the same temporal support, they
add up to 1 and are additive (as long as the a priori history commutes with
the a posteriori ones). This is, of course, exactly what Bayes’ theorem is about;
one takes probabilities and updates them to give something that are also good
probabilities.
Another programme would be to keep probabilities real (presumably be-
cause they are to be interpreted as frequencies), but to try and give a pedagog-
ical justification for a non-additive measure of relative frequency [25]. Such a
task would probably involve frequencies which don’t converge to a single value
[26, 27]. For frequencies that don’t converge to a single value, the most nat-
ural interpretation is that we are confusing contexts somehow—this is exactly
the justification given in [11] for the LP probabilities, albeit within a Bayesian
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framework. However, our Bayesian analysis need not be incompatible with no-
tions of relative frequencies as such notions (or non-convergent generalisations)
should be derivable from it as in the classical case [27].
So, although the presumption that probabilities are complex might initially
seem patently absurd, there is a certain amount of internal consistency to the
argument. Feynman has often cogently argued for the use of ‘negative proba-
bilities’ in physics [15] but these ‘negative probabilities’ don’t behave like prob-
abilities according to Cox’s axioms. The added structure provided by using
complex numbers is exactly what is required in order to make a ‘good’ notion of
probability for all complete sets of homogeneous history propositions. The real
part of our complex notion can give the standard real notion of Bayesian prob-
abilities for LP history propositions and, furthermore, can give us the standard
notion of relative frequency for the d-consistent subset. The berry phase is also
implicit in such complex assignments.
Although not yet complete, this programme includes the two main previous
quantum history theories in certain limits. This Bayesian histories programme
also suggests where we should look in order to find a physical justification for
quantum history theories; namely we point at axiom 0b (and perhaps the invo-
cation of a third axiom). It is also foundationally compatible with a relational
philosophy.
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